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Abstract – For a possibility of using the safety relevant 
system in practice, it is necessary to prove, that safety 
requirements, which are defined based on results of risk 
analysis, are fulfilled. Part of proving the safety of safety 
relevant system is also quantitative evaluation of safety 
integrity of the hardware which is involved in the safety 
functions realization. Objective of the paper is to 
compare different ways of the quantitative hardware 
safety integrity evaluation. For a specific technological 
process are identified hazards, their consequences and 
from them resulting safety functions. For each defined 
safety function is, by three different procedures, 
calculated the probability of dangerous failure per hour. 
At the end of the paper are stated reasons of results 
mismatch, which were obtained using different 
approaches. 
Keywords- safety function; safety integrity; safety 
related system; sPLC; IEC 61 508; Markov Chain; 
validation 
I.  INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1) 
If a device, machine or process may in some way 
endanger assets that are within its scope, it is necessary 
to identify the hazards, their consequences and 
subsequently to calculate (estimate) the risk. If this risk 
is higher than acceptable risk, then it is necessary to 
apply reasonable measures for the risk reduction. In 
case of technical measures are defined the safety 
functions (SFs), whose task is to minimize the hazards 
occurrence and/or minimize the hazards consequences 
so, that residual risk is lower or equal to the tolerable 
risk. Safety functions are performed by the safety 
relevant system (SRS) [21]. 
From each SF is required to achieve a certain safety 
integrity level. Safety integrity of the SRS is according 
to [1] defined as probability of safety relevant system to 
satisfactorily perform the required SFs under all 
specified conditions and within the specified time 
interval. 
Safety integrity consists of three parts [1]: 
• Systematic safety integrity – part of the safety 
integrity of the SRS related to systematic 
failures in a dangerous mode of failure; 
• Software safety integrity – part of the safety 
integrity of the SRS related to systematic 
failures in a dangerous mode of failure, that are 
attributable to software 
• Hardware safety integrity – part of the safety 
integrity of the SRS related to random 
hardware failures in a dangerous mode of 
failure. 
Generally, safety integrity associated with 
systematic failures is considered to be an incalculable 
part of safety integrity. Evaluation of this part of the 
safety integrity is realized by qualitative methods, 
whose goal is to prove, that adequate measures have 
been applied to prevent systematic failures. 
Standard [1] requires the quantitate evaluation of 
requirements fulfilment for the safety integrity, which 
is related to the random hardware failures. For 
evaluation is possible to use one method (e.g. failure 
mode and effects analysis (FMEA) [3], reliability block 
diagram method (RBD) [4], fault tree analysis (FTA) 
[5], Markov chains (MC) [6]) or a combination of 
methods. 
If the SF operates in the high demand mode of 
operation or in continuous mode of operation, then the 
achieved safety integrity level (SIL) against random 
failures is determined based on calculated value of the 
probability of dangerous failure per hour ܲܨܪ஽(ݐ) of 
the SF [1]. 
In general, calculation of ܲܨܪ஽(ݐ) can be realized 
by one of these approaches: 
• By using the relations and procedures stated in 
[7]. In [7] for individual architectures of the SF 
(1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo2, ...) are defined 
simplified relations, which are valid under 
certain assumptions. These assumptions are 
related to the technical and operational 
properties of the SRS (or its subsystems), 
which performs the given SF. 
• By using a certified tool specifically designed 
for this purpose, such a tool Safety Evaluation 
Tool from company Siemens [8]. This tool 
simplifies the application of the relations and 
procedures stated in [7]. 
• By using the mathematical-graphical model, 
that is specially designed for a given SF with 
respect to all the major factors influencing its 
hardware safety integrity, such as in [2], [18], 
[19]. 
In this paper, all three approaches of the safety 
integrity evaluation of the SFs are used with goal to 
compare results calculated by each of them. 
II. SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND THEIR REALIZATION 
Let us consider a technological cell (hereinafter 
referred to as cell), in which machining the workpiece 
takes place (Fig. 1). This cell, together with other cells, 
is part of production line and one production step is 
realized in it. After execution of all prescribed 
operations in previous cell is workpiece moved into 
 considered cell. In this considered cell are executed all 
the prescribed operations and consequently a workpiece 
is moved into next cell for further processing. 
 
Figure 1.  Technological cell 
In the considered cell is machining of workpiece 
realized using an industrial robot. Considering, that in 
working area of the robot (dangerous zone) when 
performing the prescribed operations, an injury of a 
person, who is in this dangerous zone, can happen, 
dangerous zone is fenced (passive mechanical 
protection). For possibility of workpieces transfer 
between cells, two holes are created in the fence. The 
first hole serves to transfer the workpiece from previous 
cell into the considered cell. The workpiece is 
transferred from considered cell into next cell through 
the second hole. The workpiece transfer is performed 
by automated cart. The access of the maintenance staff 
to the fenced dangerous zone is made possible through 
the doors located in one of the fencing walls. 
A. The hazards identification and safety functions 
definition 
The following hazards have been identified during 
the risk analysis of the considered technological 
process: 
• Movement the robot arm even after a person 
(maintenance) enters the cell (dangerous zone) 
through the door. 
• Movement of the robot arm even after a person 
enters the cell (dangerous zone) through the 
hole intended to transfer the workpiece from 
the previous cell. 
• Movement of the robot arm even after a person 
enters the cell (dangerous zone) through the 
hole intended to transfer the workpiece into the 
next cell. 
Each of the identified hazards can lead to serious 
injury or death of a person in the dangerous area. These 
SFs were defined for elimination of the identified 
hazards: 
• Safety function SF1 – stop the operations 
execution and disconnection of the robot from 
power source when opening the side door. 
• Safety function SF2 – stop the operations 
execution and disconnection of the robot from 
power source upon entry of a person into the 
cell through the hole intended to transfer the 
workpiece from the previous cell. 
• Safety function SF3 – stop the operations 
execution and disconnection of the robot from 
power source upon entry of a person into the 
cell through the hole intended to transfer the 
workpiece into the next cell 
• Safety function SF4 – stop the operations 
execution and disconnection of the robot from 
power source after pressing the emergency stop 
button. It is reaction of personnel to other 
unspecified hazards. 
For the above mentioned SFs, that operate in 
continuous mode, based on the estimated risk 
associated with individual hazards, the required safety 
integrity levels were determined. For the SF1 is 
required SIL2, for the SF2, SF3 and SF4 is required 
SIL3.  
B. The safety related system design 
The Fig. 2 shows block scheme of the SRS, that 
realizes safety functions SF1 to SF4. It consists of the 
sensor subsystem, the logic subsystem and the final 
element subsystem. Block Equipment Under Control 
(EUC) represents the controlled device, i.e. in case of 
considered cell, it is industrial robot. The SRS realizes 
only the SFs. Control functions of the robot are realized 
by the independent standard control system (not safety 
relevant), that does not subject to safety analysis and 
therefore is not part of the paper. 
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Figure 2.  Block scheme of the SRS 
The SRS is realized based on safety PLC (sPLC). 
Safety analysis concerns only those part of the sPLC, 
whose incorrect function can cause the dangerous 
failure of the SF. Used modules have dual-channel 
architecture and fail-safe property. These are the 
modules: 
• Processor unit (F-CPU) Simatic CPU 1512SP 
F-1 PN (6ES7512-1SK01-0AB0) [9]. 
• Digital input module (F-DI) Simatic F-DI 
8x24VDC HF (6ES7136-6BA00-0CA0) [10]. 
• Digital output module (F-DO) Simatic F-DQ 
4x24VDC/2A PM HF (6ES7136-6DB00-
0CA0) [11]. 
Task of SF1 to SF4 is to react to threatening danger 
so, that they ensure the robot disconnection from power 
source, therefore the final element subsystem will 
participate in realization of all the SFs. The robot is 
disconnected from power source by a pair of 3-pole 
contactors K1, K2 of type Sirius 3RT1026-1BB40 [12], 
whose contacts are connected in series for the required 
SIL achievement (architecture 1oo2). Contactor K1 is 
controlled by left channel of the F-DO module and 
contactor K2 is controlled by right channel of the F-DO 
module (Fig. 3). The digital output module is not 
connected directly to F-CPU, but connection is realized 
through communication module Simatic IM 155-6 PN 
ST (6ES7155-6AU00-0BN0) using the communication 
interface PROFINET [13]. Safety communication is 
ensured by PROFIsafe protocol. 
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Figure 3.  Principle of connection of the final elements block 
The sensors subsystem provides information from 
the technological process, that is relevant for the SFs 
performance. Sensors are connected to the F-DI 
modules, that communicate with F-CPU trough the 
communication module Simatic IM 155-6 PN ST [13] 
and communication interface PROFINET.  
The open door detection is provided by contact-free 
safety door switch (DS) of type Sirius 3SE6315-1BB02 
[14]. DS has dual-channel architecture and for safe 
detection of the door opening is enough to use one DS. 
Realization of the SF2 requires to distinguish 
between a situation, when workpiece enters the cell and 
a situation, when a person enters the cell. For this 
purpose, the light curtain (LC) of type Simatic FS400 
from 3RG78 44 series [15], which has SIL 3 and two 
blocks of polarized retroreflective sensors S1, S2, is 
used. Each block of optical sensors consists of a sensor 
pair (S1 - S11, S12; S2 - S21, S22) of type IFM O5P502 
(O5P-FNKG /US100) [16]. This kind of solution allows 
to achieve the required SIL, to use the Muting function 
[15] and distinguish a person from a workpiece. 
Condition of distinguishing a person from a workpiece 
is appropriate layout of these sensors considering the 
light curtain. The Muting function is realized by 2-
sensor connection of type T (Fig. 4.a). A similar 
solution is also used for realization of the safety 
function SF3 (Fig. 4.b). 
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Figure 4.  Principle of the sensor connection for the SF2 and SF3 
Part of realization of the SF4 is emergency stop 
button (E-STOP) of type Sirius 3SB3500-1AA20 [17], 
which has dual-channel architecture. 
Manufacturers, for individual components, that 
participate in the SFs realization, either give directly the 
value ܲܨܪ஽  (for electronic elements), or give 
parameters (ܤଵ଴, ...), based on which the value ܲܨܪ஽ 
can be calculated, if a number of operation cycles of 
given element per year is known (for electromechanical 
elements). In calculations of ܲܨܪ஽ for individual SFs 
the following values are considered: 
• Door sensor (Sirius 3SE6315-1BB02): 
ܲܨܪ஽஽ௌ = 2,7. 10ିଵ଴ h-1. 
• Polarized retroreflective optical sensor (IFM 
O5P502 (O5P-FNKG/US100)): ܲܨܪ஽ௌ௜ =1,30. 10ି଻ h-1, where ݅ = 1,2,3,4. 
• Light curtain (Simatic FS400 from 3RG78 44 
series): ܲܨܪ஽௅஼ଵ = ܲܨܪ஽௅஼ଶ = 2,67. 10ି଼ h-1. 
• Emergency stop button (Sirius 3SB3500-
1AA20): ܲܨܪ஽ாௌ்ை௉ = 6,84. 10ିଽ h-1 . 
• Contactor (Sirius 3RT10261BB40): ܲܨܪ	஽௄ଵ =ܲܨܪ	஽௄ଶ = ܲܨܪ஽௄ଵଶ = 1,3. 10ି଻ h-1. 
• Digital input module (Simatic F-DI 8x24VDC 
HF): ܲܨܪ஽஽ூ = 1. 10ିଽ h-1. 
• Digital output module (Simatic F-DQ 
4x24VDC/2A PM HF (6ES7136-6DB00-
0CA0)): ܲܨܪ஽஽ை = 1. 10ିଽ h-1. 
• Logic unit (Simatic CPU 1512SP F-1 PN 
(6ES7512-1SK01-0AB0)): ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎ =2. 10ିଽ h-1 (including the PROFIsafe). 
Communication safety on the basis of PROFIsafe 
protocol (including transmission components) has 
individual safety assessment. The intensity of the 
dangerous falsification of transmitted message (about 
1.10-9 h-1) is negligible in comparison to the required 
SIL for individual SFs and therefore it is not considered 
further [20].  
Overall realization of the SRS is shown in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5.  Technical solution of the SRS 
C. Assignment of safety functions to individual part 
of the SRS 
For each SF is necessary to determine, which parts 
of the SRS participate in SF realizations. This is shown 
in Fig. 6. 
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Figure 6.  Assignment of safety functions to individual part of the 
SRS 
 III. CALCULATION OF THE DANGEROUS FAILURE 
RATE OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION SF1 
The paper presents the calculation of the dangerous 
failure rate of the safety function SF1 by three different 
approaches. In all three cases, the same assumptions are 
made. The same approach was applied in calculation of 
ܲܨܪ஽  for the SF2, SF3 and SF4. 
A. Calculation using the mathematical-graphical 
model 
The Fig. 7 shows Continuous-Time Markov Chain 
(CTMC), which describes transition of the safety 
function SF1 from the no-failure, safe state (state 1) into 
the state, which corresponds to the dangerous failure of 
the SF1 (state 3). The state 2 represents the situation, 
when contactor K1 or K2 has the potentially dangerous 
failure. 
1
OK
2
Failure of 
K1 or K2
3
D
2ܲܨܪܦܭ12 ܲܨܪܦܭ12 
ߚܦ.ܲܨܪܦܭ12
ߚܦ. ܲܨܪܦܭ12
ܲܨܪܦܦܵ + ܲܨܪܦܦܫ + ܲܨܪܦܥܷܲ + ܲܨܪܦܦܱ 
ܲܨܪܦܦܵ + ܲܨܪܦܦܫ + ܲܨܪܦܥܷܲ + ܲܨܪܦܦܱ 
 
Figure 7.  CTMC of the safety function SF1 
The intensity of the state 3 occurrence corresponds 
to the dangerous failure rate of the SF1. From CTMC 
in Fig. 7 can be deduced, that 
ܲܨܪ஽ௌிଵ= ܲܨܪ஽஽ௌ + ܲܨܪ஽஽ூ + ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎ + ܲܨܪ஽஽ை+ ߚ஽. ܲܨܪ஽௄ଵଶ
+
2. ܲܨܪ஽௄ଵଶ ቀ݁ି௉ிுವ಼భమ.௧ − ݁ିଶ.௉ிுವ಼భమ.௧ቁ
2݁ି௉ிுವ಼భమ.௧ − ݁ିଶ.௉ிுವ಼భమ.௧ , 
(1) 
where ܲܨܪ஽஽ௌ  is the probability of dangerous failure 
per hour of the door sensor, ܲܨܪ஽஽ூ  is the probability of 
dangerous failure per hour of the digital input module, 
ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎ is the probability of dangerous failure per hour 
of the processor unit, ܲܨܪ஽஽ை  is the probability of 
dangerous failure per hour of the digital output module, 
ܲܨܪ஽௄ଵଶ is the probability of dangerous failure per hour 
of the contactor and ߚ஽  is the proportion of the 
contactor detectable failures with common cause. 
Based on recommendations [7], technical 
parameters of contactor, realization of the SRS and 
operational properties of the SRS, it was determined, 
that ߚ஽ = 0.05 and the proof test interval ଵܶ = 8	760 h 
(proof test is perfect). After using these values in (1), it 
can be calculated, that ܲܨܪ஽ௌிଵ = 1,107. 10ି଼  h-1 
(maximum value). 
Since the standard [7] considers the mean value of 
the probability of dangerous failure per hour, for 
calculation of this value the equation (2) was used with 
result ܲܨܪ஽_௠௘௔௡ௌிଵ = 1.092 ∗ 10ି଼ h-1. 
ܲܨܪ஽_௠௘௔௡ௌிଵ =
1
ଵܶ
න ܲܨܪ஽ௌிଵ݀ݐ
భ்
଴
 
(2) 
B. Calculation according to IEC EN 61508-6 
In [7] the block diagrams for different SF 
architectures and related relations for calculation of 
observed parameters are stated. The block diagram of 
the safety function SF1 is shown in Fig. 8.  
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Figure 8.  RBD of the safety function SF1 
The block diagram consists of serial connection of 
the elements, that participate in the SF1 realization 
(dangerous failure of any element causes the dangerous 
failure of the SF1), therefore the probability of 
dangerous failure per hour of the SF1 is calculated as: 
ܲܨܪ஽ௌிଵ = ܲܨܪ஽஽ௌ + ܲܨܪ஽஽ூ + ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎ +ܲܨܪ஽஽ை + ܲܨܪ஽௄ . 
(3) 
Because of serial connection of the contactors K1, 
K2 contacts in circuit of the robot power source, the 
dangerous failure of the SF1 due to the contactors 
failure can be described by the block diagram (Fig. 9), 
that in [7] corresponds to architecture 1oo2. Block CCF 
in Fig. 9 represents the common cause failures of the 
contactors K1 and K2. 
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Figure 9.  RBD of the robot contactors pair 
According to [7] the probability of dangerous 
failure per hour for the group of components connected 
in architecture 1oo2, considering identical channels and 
continuous mode of operation, is calculated as 
ܲܨܪ஽ଵ௢௢ଶ = 2((1 − ߚ஽)ߣ஽஽ + (1 −ߚ)ߣ஽௎)ଶݐ஼ா + ߚ஽ߣ஽஽ + ߚߣ஽௎, 
(4) 
where ܲܨܪ஽ଵ௢௢ଶ is the probability of dangerous failure 
per hour for the group of components connected in 
architecture 1oo2, ߣ஽஽  is the dangerous detectable 
failures rate, ߣ஽௎ is the dangerous undetectable failures 
rate, ߚ is the proportion of undetectable failures with 
common cause, ߚ஽  is the proportion of detectable 
failures with common cause and ݐ஼ா  is the channel 
equivalent mean downtime. The following relations are 
related to (4): 
ߣ஽௎ = ߣ஽(1 − ܦܥ), ߣ஽஽ = ߣ஽.ܦܥ,	
ݐ஼ா =
ߣ஽௎
ߣ஽ ൬
ଵܶ
2 + ܯܴܶܶ൰ +
ߣ஽஽
ߣ஽ ܯܴܶܶ, 
(5) 
 where ߣ஽  is the channel dangerous failure rate, ܦܥ  is 
the diagnostic coverage, ଵܶ  is the proof test interval 
and ܯܴܶܶ is the mean time to recovery. 
Based on recommendations [7], technical 
parameters of contactor, realization of the SRS 
and operational properties of the SRS, individual 
parameters were determined as follows: ܯܴܶܶ = 8	h, 
ܦܥ = 1 , ߚ஽ = 0.05 , ߚ = 2. ߚ஽ = 0.1 , ଵܶ = 8	760  h 
(proof test is perfect). After using these values in (4) 
and (5), it can be calculated, that ܲܨܪ஽௄ = ܲܨܪ஽ଵ௢௢ଶ =6.501 ∗ 10ିଽ h-1. 
Then, from (3) can be calculated, that ܲܨܪ஽ிௌଵ =1.078. 10ି଼	hିଵ. 
C. Calculation using the Safety Evaluation Tool 
The Fig. 10 shows basic output information 
provided by the Safety Evaluation Tool, that is related 
to the SF1. Using this tool, it was calculated, that 
ܲܨܪ஽ிௌଵ = 1,16425. 10ି଼ h-1. 
 
Figure 10.  Basic information from the Safety Evaluation Tool for 
the SF1 
IV. RESULTS COMPARISON 
The Tab. 1 and Tab. 2 contain calculated values of 
the ܲܨܪ஽  and corresponding achieved SIL for 
individual SFs. 
For all the safety functions (SF1 to SF4) were 
calculated the values of the ܲܨܪ஽ , which correspond 
SIL3, what is in accordance with the defined 
requirements for SF2, SF3, SF4. For the SF1 was 
required the SIL2 and achieved the SIL3. It is not in 
contradiction with safety, but there is scope for using 
components with worse safety properties, if it would 
lead to the reduction of the SRS price. 
The Tab. 1 and Tab. 2 show, that values of the 
ܲܨܪ஽  calculated by different approaches are 
approximately the same and differences are negligible. 
Existing differences are caused by the fact, that each of 
used methods uses certain simplifications with the aim 
to resulting relations are easier to use in practice. 
Using the Safety Evaluation Tool and procedures 
stated in [7] has certain limitations. It is possible to use 
them only if architecture of evaluated SF and technical 
and operational properties of the SRS, that realizes 
given SF, are in compliance with assumptions stated in 
[7]. Conversely, the method of the ܲܨܪ஽  calculation 
based on CTMC has universal use, but it is 
computationally demanding. Also, the probability of 
mistake when model creating is increasing in complex 
solutions of the SF. 
 
 
 
TABLE I.  CALCULATED PROBABILITY OF DANGEROUS 
FAILURE PER HOUR (PART 1) 
Calculation 
method 
SF1 SF2 
ࡼࡲࡴࡰ 
[h-1] SIL 
ࡼࡲࡴࡰ 
[h-1] SIL 
Safety 
Evaluation Tool 
1.077
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
5.020
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
IEC EN 61508 1.078∗ 10ି଼ 3 
5.153
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
CTMC 1.092∗ 10ି଼ 3 
5.064
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
TABLE II.  CALCULATED PROBABILITY OF DANGEROUS 
FAILURE PER HOUR (PART 2) 
Calculation 
method 
SF3 SF4 
ࡼࡲࡴࡰ 
[h-1] SIL 
ࡼࡲࡴࡰ 
[h-1] SIL 
Safety 
Evaluation Tool 
5.020 
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
1.734
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
IEC EN 61508 5.153∗ 10ି଼ 3 
1.734
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
CTMC 5.064∗ 10ି଼ 3 
1.749
∗ 10ି଼ 3 
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